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ABSTRACT 
VIOLENCE AND HORROR: THE ANTI-TECHNOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY 
Christopher W. Curry 
March 25, 2007 
This thesis is about graphic representations of violence and SUbjectivity. 
Simply stated, the violence in many recent horror films is motivated by a nihilism 
resulting from frustration with the inadequacy of contemporary SUbjectivity. I want to 
explore the potential such representations have for providing a means of radically 
undermining the contemporary category of subjectivity. This subversion is due to what I 
call the inverted mirror stage effect in combination with a particular dislocation of the 
audience that is associated with the spectacle of violence displayed in contemporary, or 
postmodern, horror films. My theoretical approach is a cultural materialist psychoanalytic 
one that facilitates the traversal of the gap between individual and society by focusing 
attention not merely on society as a product of individuals, or vice versa, but instead upon 
the dynamic interaction of the two. Also, this essay draws upon the work of several 
feminist film theorists, including Carol J. Clover, Judith Halberstam, and Laura Mulvey. 
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"For this consciousness was not in peril and fear for this element or that, nor for this or 
that moment of time, it was afraid for its entire being; it felt the fear of death, the 
sovereign master. It has been in that experience melted to its inmost soul, has trembled 
throughout its every fibre, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it. This 
complete perturbation of its entire substance, this absolute dissolution of all its stability 
into fluent continuity, is, however, the simple ultimate nature of self-consciousness, 
absolute negativity ... " GWF Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (237). 
VIOLENCE AND HORROR 
There is a basic relationship of violence and horror. Whether violence is real, that 
is to say it takes place, that violence actually happens, that the peril of violence is 
realized, or whether merely the threat of violence exists, the peril of potential violence, 
one or the other of these situations does not make a difference when it comes to ascribing 
violence as the central motivating force in a horror film. It is important to distinguish 
between fear and horror. Fear, the sensation that is most associated with horror films, is 
actually rather non-essential to the experience of a horror film. In fact, the fear-provoking 
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elements of horror films often have little to do with the violence in these films, other than 
the rather obvious fear that some may viewers may experience as a vicarious reaction to 
on-screen deaths, an expression of the viewers' more or less conscious "fear" of death 1• 
Fear is often the result of viewers estrangement within the fictional world of the horror 
film, a feeling not dissimilar to (but not entirely identical with) Freud's famous 
explanation of unheimlich, the uncanny. Suspense, uncertainty, the sense that although 
things seem normal they are in fact not, the feeling that there is something lurking 
beneath or behind the otherwise genteel exteriors of normal experience that is somehow 
menacing, these are fear-provoking elements common in horror films. Their relation to 
the uncanny is clear enough, but they are not enough to make horror. Horror is physical, 
it is bodily. The word has roots in a physical description, the Latin horrer meaning 
"bristling." I don't want to push the etymology too much but its worth mentioning that 
fear appears to be psychological in nature while horror is physical; fear happens in the 
mind, an intellectual response, while horror is of the body, in the body, and, as it were, 
can be found in opening up the body. 
Strip away all the generic conventions of horror and there is an identifiable 
situation that is basic, one that can be described as follows: a subject is in peril of 
violence. Horror is always about the peril of violence upon a subject, violence that is 
either real - the peril realized - or potential - the peril postponed. Horror films can be 
characterized as either the pursuit of the realization of this potential violence, a threat in 
pursuit of a victim or victims, or as the realization of this potential, a threat executing 
J Compare with the Freudian theory of the joke in The loke and its Relation to the Unconscious. 
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violence upon a victim or victims. How many horror films do not fit this formula? Are 
there any? The horror genre is privileged in this essay. Violence plays a role in other 
aesthetic genres, certainly, but violence is not fundamental to any other contemporary 
aesthetic genre in the same way it is for horror. 
Another reason is the radical nature of horror films. The radical progressive 
potential of horror films has long been recognized, at least from Robin Wood's seminal 
1979 essay "An Introduction to the American Horror Film." Wood argues that horror 
films need to be understood politically and as social critique-"I have stressed," he 
writes, "the genre's progressive or radical elements, its potential for the subversion of 
bourgeois patriarchal norms" (192). One such potential for subversion is the very topic of 
this essay, the subversion of modern sUbjectivity2. Wood goes on to distinguish between 
"the reactionary horror film," in which progressive ideas are diminished or entirely absent 
(Wood's primary example is Halloween), and what he calls "the 'apocalyptic' horror 
film": 
The latter expresses, obviously, despair and negativity, yet its very negation can 
be claimed as progressive: the "apocalypse," even when presented in metaphysical 
terms (the end of the world), is generally reinterpretable in social/political ones 
(the end of the highly specific world of patriarchal capitalism). The majority of 
the most distinguished American horror films (especially in the 70's) are 
concerned with this particular apocalypse; they are progressive in so far as their 
negativity is not recuperable into the dominant ideology, but constitutes (on the 
contrary) the recognition of that ideology's disintegration, its untenability, as all it 
has repressed explodes and blows it apart. (192) 
2 See Lacan's "The Subversion of the Subject and The Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious." 
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In Wood's formulation the potential for positive change found in horror film begins with 
its "negative capability,,,3 that is to say its ability to negate, subvert, and undermine. In 
this manner horror functions less as a socio-cultural corrective than as a means of 
clearing away space in which other forms of socio-cultural constructs (which is 
purposefully not to say "better" or "worse" forms) can come into being. It is this radical 
progressive potential and the intrinsic relationship of the genre and violence that accounts 
for the focus on horror films. 
If violence is essential, then the horror film can then be understood, in a sense, as 
a staging of this essential violence, as a means of representing violence. Since film is 
inevitably a medium of visual representation it is therefore essentially of interest to 
examine the manner in which violence has been visually represented in horror films. 
Only through an analysis of the visual elements can horror films be read in relation to 
Wood's claim. Consider, for instance, the difference in representation of violence in two 
horror films from two different eras: Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho (1960) and Eli Roth's 
Hostel (2005). 
Both films are about the horror that befalls more or less innocent victims while 
staying in rented places of lodging, and thus share an immediate thematic connection. 
Furthermore, both films are concerned with psychic economies of sex and violence. 
Norman Bates cannot resist being overwhelmed by the need to commit violence 
whenever his libido is aroused; an increase in his sexual energy results in a homicidal 
surge of violence. Moreover, it is significant that his violence expresses itself in explicitly 
3 Not Keats' concept but the Marxist version associated with the Frankfurt School. 
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sexual terms, the stabbing of a naked female body is very much a perverse analogy to the 
sex act that he desires but cannot enact. Hitchcock's film is essentially reactionary, 
dogmatic, and self-Ioathing-the drive of the film seems to be one of establishing 
patriarchal authority but in doing so masculinity becomes contaminated with a perverse 
feminine sexuality. In Hostel both sex and violence are explicitly described as types of 
commodified pleasures, more or less equal (though at least one character specifically 
claims to enjoy the pleasure of violence more than the pleasure of sex), and both 
available for a price. Hostel is very much concerned with demonstrating the basic 
dehumanization inherent in utilitarian-inspired capitalist thinking: pleasure is (a) good, 
pleasure can be bought and sold, pleasure is an end, the ultimate end, in itself. Questions 
regarding the nature of pleasure, about its costs (in an extra-fiduciary sense, as in cost of 
human lives), are irrelevant. Finally, the Bates Motel and the Slovakian hostel are 
especially terrifying due to the breach of social code that takes place within their walls: 
the victims have paid for safety, instead they have purchased their doom. All manner of 
basic assumptions about civil society are upset by the situations in these two films, but 
what I want to limit my focus to is the manner in which the horror, which is to say the 
violence, that occurs in these two films is depicted. 
Psycho, released in 1960, "changed the way Americans understood horror," 
according to Kendall R. Phillip (64). It was in Psycho that the horror hid itself under a 
blanket of banality, or so goes the standard reading of the film. In fact, instead of de-
centering the genre of horror by remaking the monster as the boy next door, the film 
actually reinforces the standard, or what I'll refer to as the modern, model of horror-the 
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horror ex-sists in an otherwise normal world, it comes from outside, it is an aberration. I 
will return to this point. For now it suffices to say that Psycho is for me the pre-eminent 
cinematic example of modern horror. 
The shower scene is perhaps the single most well known cinematic death in 
history, "the most famous sequence in the history of American cinema" (Phillips 63). 
Many people know the scene without actually having seen the entire film. It is a cultural 
icon. Homages to, not to say outright thefts from, the scene abound in subsequent films, 
ranging from comical parodies (Mel Brooks' High Anxiety) to deadly serious 
reinterpretations (DePalma's Dressed to Kill). One merely has to invoke the staccato 
violin stabs of Bernard Herrman's equally iconic score in order to bring disturbing 
images of brutal murder to mind. But in examining the scene itself one might be 
surprised, especially if one has seen a film such as Hostel, at how little actual violence is 
shown. 
Certainly the scene is violent: a woman is brutally stabbed to death. But the 
violence is not represented in a manner which seems particularly violent in comparison to 
a film like Hostel. There are no close-ups of Norman's knife piercing Marian's flesh, no 
shots of wounds spurting blood, in fact there are no shots in which the audience sees 
Norman (in full frame) stab Marian (also in full frame simultaneously) at all. The knife is 
raised, it falls, there is the sound effect of blade into body (a total of eight), Marian 
screams and fights. There is, very briefly (lasting less than a second when the film is 
played at half speed), the image of the knife's tip drawing a bit of blood right beneath 
Marian's belly button; this single moment of contact between steel and flesh is followed 
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by Marian's cry "Oh!" There is blood, yes, but very little. What is most striking about this 
image is the undisguised conflation of sexual mutilation, sexual pleasure, and the male 
gaze upon the vulnerable female subject. The next knife blow, apparently landing in 
Marian's heart, is followed by the first shot of the bottom of the bathtub where blood 
spatters and drips (as is well-known, chocolate syrup was used for the blood). Marian 
turns and is stabbed once more, then falls. Norman flees. The camera settles upon 
Marian, slumped in the tub and breathing hard. She tries to pull herself up with the 
shower curtain but it breaks loose and she falls into the bathroom floor, halfway out of 
the tub. Another tracking shot follows, probably the film's most famous one, in which the 
water swirls down into the dark of the shower drain, the shot dissolving into a darkness 
that becomes Marian's pupil in the next shot. The entire scene lasts barely a minute, with 
the actual violence of the attack contained in half that amount of time. The most famous 
murder in cinema is over very quickly. The violence in Psycho is rapid, largely implied, 
and ends in death. 
Not so in Hostel. 
Violence in Hostel is slow, laborious, very explicit, and is, in and of itself, totally 
unrelated to death. Violence in Hostel is not about murder, although it is a rather safe bet 
most of the victims of violence end up dead. It is worth pointing out thought that those 
characters who are simply murdered in the film, as opposed to submitted to torture, all 
die (more or less) quickly. Murder happens, but it is not usually subject to the same 
7 
spectacle that violence is in this film4. Hostel's plot concerns an agency located in 
Slovakia that provides human victims to high paying clients who, in the confines of a 
dungeon-like abattoir, can then do what they please with them. The film can be read in 
various ways, but in my view it is primarily a critique of global capitalism, conflating as 
it does the exploitative capitalist mentality with a need for violence. 
What makes Hostel different from Psycho, and this is, generally speaking, the 
difference between classic (or modern) horror films and contemporary (or postmodern) 
horror films is the manner in which the violence is represented, both in terms of visual 
representation and in terms of motive. The violence is its own purpose. The pleasure of 
violence, exulting in savoring violence, violence as a visual pleasure-these are the 
concerns of the postmodern horror film with violence. What happens to Marian is 
necessary for the logic of the fictional worldS in which Psycho takes place (there must be 
some transgression of the normal in order to identify an aberration-it is the aberration 
that is "psycho"); it is equally necessary for the narrative logic of the film (something has 
to happen to Marian). The violence is a consequence of the murder, the latter which is 
necessary for both the logic of the film's fictional world and the narrative. 
The violence in Hostel isn't necessary for the logic of its fictional world; it is a 
consequence. As for its relation to the narrative, it will become apparent from what 
follows that the violence has no place, properly speaking, within the film's narrative. 
4 Paxton shoots a number of people once he escapes; they all die perfunctorily. He also drives a car over 
some other people. The only murder that takes on some aspect of the rest of the violence of the film, and 
this is surely intentional, is Paxton's final confrontation with the Surgeon. It is significant that the previous 
murders were all carried out at a distance (a gun, from inside a car), while the last killing takes place with a 
razor blade in very close quarters. 
5 The logic of the film's fictional world, which I'll later refer to as the ontology of the fictional world, will 
become significant as this discussion proceeds. See Section Three, The Model p. 25. 
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Instead, the narrative derives from the need to display violence. What happens to Josh 
isn't about violence taking place in a narrative. It is about the spectacle of violence. It is 
about torture6. 
Elaine Scarry, in her landmark study of torture The Body in Pain, claims that one 
cross-cultural constant in torture is the elevation of the instruments into an aspect of the 
process. She describes this taking place through the visual display of the instruments, 
allowing the victim to acquire visual familiarity with the instruments of torture before the 
torture takes place. For Scarry the torture is already taking place in this visual display; the 
display is as much a part of the torture as is the use. 
Roth constructs the scene of Josh's torture in such a manner as to emphasize the 
implements, to draw attention to the equipment of this filthy business. There are several 
close ups of dirty table tops strewn with grimy hand tools, odd angled pieces of metal, 
needle nose pliers, rusty implements of all sorts, and one heavy duty high powered drill 
with a mean looking foot long 1,4 inch bit. Josh's position as spectator is limited at first 
due to the hood he wakes up wearing. The first shots of the scene are from within this 
mask: the audience looking through one ragged edge hole, hearing Josh's up close heavy 
breathing and muttered cries. But once the Surgeon has entered, exposed himself as the 
ultimate implement, the guiding will of torture, off comes the hood and Josh (along with 
the audience) gets a full view of the dungeon abattoir. Of course, this is when Josh's 
pleading begins in earnest. During this sequence of crying and begging for mercy the 
6 The cinematic image of violence in recent horror films is often one of torture-in fact, several film 
critics, such as New York Magazine's David Edelstein, have labeled the new horror genre as "torture porn," 
citing films like The Devil's Rejects, Saw, Wolf Creek and even Mel Gibson's controversial The Passion of 
the Christ, as examples ("Torture Porn"). 
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audience perspective shifts to that of the Surgeon as he examines the instruments at 
hand-this is when the sweeping shot of the table littered with tools takes place. This is 
the last time in the scene that perspective is so fully accommodated by one of the 
characters. After this point the audience vantage point is somewhat like a third person 
limited narrator: taking in the action from neither character's direct point of view but not 
having total access to what's happening either. For instance, although the piercing of 
Josh's thigh with the drill is shown in extreme close-up it is not clear from which 
character's perspective, if either, the audience is seeing it. Also, when the Surgeon 
unbinds Josh and tells him he's free to go, after opening up the door, the camera angle is 
such that the audience cannot see-until Josh has already tried to stand, which is to say 
until its too late-that the Surgeon has used his scalpel to slash Josh's Achilles tendons 
while un-cuffing him. The audience experiences this horror, that the offer of escape was 
just another cruelty, just as Josh experiences the pain of his legs breaking off from his 
feet, pitching him helplessly to the floor. 
This is another way in which this scene draws upon Scarry's description of 
torture: she claims that by making the scene of torture, the very situation of the torturer 
and the tortured, so much a part of the torture process, then the "unmaking" effect of 
torture is heightened. One way of doing this is to hold out the offer of freedom without 
ever intending to follow up on it. The tortured person is made aware of the limits of their 
body, the absurdity of their body's position in the space of torture, the frailty of their 
body under the pressures of torture, and it is this awareness that is integral to their 
unmaking. It is significant just how much the tortured person's concept of their own body 
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comes into play in the unmaking effect of torture; as will be more fully explained, it is 
exactly this self-conception as a body that is at stake in the subjectivity-disintegrating 
effect of violence in contemporary horror films. 
What makes the scene of Josh's torture distinct from the shower scene is the 
difference in purpose. Hitchcock filmed a death scene, calculating its effect in a narrative 
scheme and with the logic of his fictional world dictating his choices. Marian's murder 
was a major turning point in the story and was necessary in order to demonstrate the 
aberrant "psycho" run amok in an otherwise 'normal" world. In Hostel death is not the 
purpose of the violence, it is not the proverbial payoff. In fact, the audience never even 
sees Josh's death (unlike other contemporary horror films Hostel never actually shows 
anyone tortured to death). The violence is its own purpose, it is violence for its own sake, 
it is violence so that the audience can experience the spectacle of violence. The Surgeon 
commits the violence in order to experience for himself the pleasure of torture-a 
pleasure, one should not forget, that is not only bought but that is also explicitly linked 
with sexual pleasure. For instance, while the Americans are still in Amsterdam there is a 
scene in which Josh wanders down an ultraviolet-lit brothel hallway, passing translucent 
doors through which he can see (and hear) the sounds of commodified sexual pleasure; 
later, in the Slovakian abattoir, that scene is mirrored when Paxton is captured and 
dragged down the hallway, passing several open doors through which he can see (it is 
significant these doors are open: he can see the violence) several scenes of gruesome 
torture. It is at the end of this latter scene that the audience sees (with Paxton), for the 
first time, Josh's corpse, chest cavity splayed open, now in the process of being operated 
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on by the Surgeon. Death, it seems, is merely an afterthought, something that happens as 
a result but not as the only intended result. The relationship of sex and violence in Hostel 
could be stated in these terms: like sex, violence takes place as an activity with its end in 
the experience of the act, not the outcome. But, and any serious analysis must not lose 
sight of this obvious fact, the Surgeon doesn't just commit the violence for his own 
pleasure, for the pleasure of his own experience. He also commits violence so that the 
audience can experience it too. 
The violence of the torture is its own end, its own purpose. It is less about 
narrative necessity and more about displaying the spectacle of violence enacted upon the 
body. This is characteristic of contemporary, or postmodern, horror films. How does one 
explain this difference from classic, or modern, horror films? Its not the case that 
audience preferences have simply grown more sadistic in recent years; in fact, according 
to Carol Clover, in her hugely influential study of horror films Men, Women and 
Chainsaws, through identification audiences experience horror films not as detached third 
person viewers (which would be a necessary condition for sadistic voyeurism to be an 
issue) but instead more personally, more intimately. Fascinated by the flickering images 
on the screen, the audience identifies with what they see, what they see becomes, in a 
sense, a part of what they are. Identification is basic to the frightening effects of a horror 
film: if it were not for an audience placing themselves in the peril they witness on screen 
there would be no fear, no horror. In other words, it is via audience identification that the 
12 
fear effects of horror are possible: the audience experiences the film as if they were a part 
of the film, as if they were the victims 7, and, as Clover argued, as the victimizers. 
It seems to me that the lasting effect of a horror film, in terms of identification, 
would derive from the manner in which the audience related to the narrative in which the 
violence took place, that is to say the narrative of the film. The relationship of audience to 
horror film narrative has changed dramatically from the modern to postmodern era, and 
this is due to a shift in ontology of the films' fictional worlds. This point will be 
explained more fully. Ultimately the film's narrative imposes some limit upon 
identification, or at least orders things in such a way as to emphasize identification with 
one figure or another. This is why the violence of contemporary horror films seems 
especiall y problematic. 
As Hostel demonstrates the violence often takes place outside of the narrative, in 
the sense that narrative necessity does little to explain it. What this means is that while 
Marian's murder is certainly violent it is conceptually a part of the narrative, it is 
contained within the narrative, it is thus neutralized by the narrative (by this I mean it is 
made to serve its purpose and nothing more), and it is nothing without the narrative, 
nothing in the sense of taking the scene out of its context renders it meaningless. The 
scene of violence, looked at as mere juxtapositions of knife raised, woman screaming, 
knife raised, woman screaming, lacks clear communicative function. Something is 
7 Clover's argument is much more nuanced than this brief reference indicates. Her focus is on the dialectic 
of identification that takes place between audience and victim/victimizer in horror films, resulting in cross-
gender identifications with gendered subject positions that signify particular location within violent 
economy of the film; for example, victimizers are often male, yet obviously gendered as feminine (Norman 
Bates is archetypal in this respect), resulting in an identification with a feminine-male killer subject 
position. Alternately, Clover argues, the survivor is often a female that is gendered masculine, resulting in 
the masculine-female Final Girl subject position. 
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happening, but in order to make sense of what it is gaps must be filled in (specifically the 
obvious gap of what takes place between "knife raised" and "woman screaming"); it is 
filling in these gaps, which occurs naturally and as a part of the experience of the film's 
narrative, that the scene's communicative function is fulfilled. There must be symbolic 
mediation of one kind or another, and within the film this symbolic mediation is via the 
narrative, in order for the images of Marian's death to have meaning. In Hostel, on the 
other hand, even within the film's narrative Josh's torture really makes no sense and if it 
is taken out of context, viewed merely as images of torture, its meaning (as I understand 
it) remains intact: a body is being unmade through violence. 
In Psycho detaching the violence from the narrative disables the efficacy of the of 
the scene to communicate-signification, therefore symbolization, is essential to the 
quality of the modem cinematic horror film. The image of violence has meaning only in 
relation to narrative, which is to say symbolization. Resisting symbolization nullifies 
communicative coherence. In Hostel on the other hand the violence detaches 
meaningfully from the film's narrative, receptive to various interpretations. This is due in 
large part to the communicative weight carried by the careful representation of the scene 
of violence, incorporating all the visual elements towards that one end of expressing a 
situation of a hyper-real embodied-ness via a medium of disembodied influence. The 
image of violence frees itself from narrative, escapes the confines of symbolization, in 
order to take meaning with it into other domains of experience. 
Having isolated the spectacle of violence in torture porn horror films, I now want 
to argue that it reflects a frustration with the inadequacy of contemporary subjectivity. 
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This frustration has led to horror films in which violence is central to the cinematic 
experience, yet not contained by the film's narrative, therefore enabling it to have an 
effect of undermining subjectivity, subverting and annihilating it. This annihilation of 
subjectivity begins with the elimination of identity. This is a consequence of the violent 
act's power to affect subjectivity at its core, deeper than mere identity, on the body. The 
dehumanization inherent in violence stems from its ability to cut, so to speak, straight to 
the heart of a particular human being, into the body of the subject, to make obsolete all 
the identifying differences between one human being and another, to render one and the 
other equal in terms written upon the body of the subject, terms of suffering, pain, fear 
and death. 
I insist upon contemporary subjectivity to emphasize the constructed-ness of 
subjectivity, a condition that is inevitably socio-historically contingent. This frustration 
with subjectivity's inadequacy stems from the failure of the modern subject to realize a 
world in which it can be globally prosperous; despite all the technological innovation of 
the previous two hundred years, innovations in agriculture, industry, medicine, and 
meeting the necessities of life, the same period has been marked by world war, genocide, 
and the threat of global annihilation. Terror and murder characterize the modern era; the 
dreams of the Enlightenment choked on the smoke of concentration camp furnaces. There 
is both conscious and unconscious frustration with the condition of the modern subject. I 
have decided to focus upon the latter, especially the manner in which this has been 
expressed in aesthetic cultural productions, such as the horror film. In my view the 
increasing graphic representations of violence in horror films, as well as the turn towards 
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torture as the means of this violence, since the 1960's is indicative of an unconscious 
gesture towards dismantling subjectivity as a first step towards imagining some new form 
of social life. 
Torture, as Scarry argues, is primarily about the "unmaking" of a victim's 
subjectivity. She writes, "the created world of thought and feeling, all the psychological 
and mental content that constitutes both one's self and one's world, and that gives rise to 
and is in turn made possible by language, ceases to exist" (30). This function of torture, 
along with the inverted mirror stage effect, a process of disintegration facilitated by the 
peculiar dislocation of audience identification that takes place in these films, makes 
contemporary horror films potential subjectivity subverting machines, anti-technologies 
of subjectivity. 
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THE SUTURE AND ABYSS 
A major tenet in the psychoanalytically influenced film theory of the previous 
thirty years is that audiences identify in various ways with the film image; Laura 
Mulvey's "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" is one example of a text from this 
tradition, a highly influential one. Mulvey recognized the Imaginary at work in cinematic 
experience: " ... it is an image that constitutes the matrix of the imaginary, of 
recognition/mis-recognition and identification, and hence of the first articulation of the I, 
of subjectivity" (61). She goes on to link "fascination with looking" with the "initial 
inklings of self-awareness" (61). For Mulvey there is a clear connection between the 
visual, identification with an image, subjectivity, and cinema. She explicitly couples her 
discussion of audience identification with an explication of the mirror stage, "[t]he 
cinema satisfies a primordial wish for pleasurable looking, but it also goes further, 
developing scopophilia in its narcissistic aspect" (61). The cinematic screen and the 
mirror are similar, she goes on to say, in that both are involved in "framing ... the human 
form in its surroundings," and concludes "the cinema has structures of fascination strong 
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enough to allow temporary loss of the ego while simultaneously reinforcing it. .. [this] 
forgetting the world as the ego has come to perceive it (I forgot who I am and where I 
was) is nostalgically reminiscent of that pre-subjective moment of image recognition 
[taking place in the mirror stage]" (62). 
Of course, Mulvey's major point in that essay is to elaborate upon the two forms 
of identification she discerns in the cinematic experience, the scopophilic and narcissistic. 
However, it is significant that in her discussion of audience identification she invokes 
Jacques Lacan's mirror stage. Mulvey seems to suggest that an identification similar to 
the one that precedes subjectivity takes place in cinematic experience; the image occupies 
a position in relation to the audience that brings it into contact with the audience's most 
basic psychic tendencies. The image is either an object of desire (scopophilia) or an 
object of narcissistic identification., 
Narcissistic identification would be an apt name for the identification Lacan 
described taking place during the mirror stage. Indeed, during the mirror stage 
identification, the assumption of the specular image has to be considered the highest 
possible fulfillment of the narcissistic desire: the self literally becomes the image, an 
absolute merger of identity and image, or, even better, identity (which in my view is 
always an after-effect of subjectivity) only becomes possible by the complete immersion 
in the image. Of course this is what Mulvey is getting at in claiming that the cinema 
develops "scopophilia in its narcissistic aspect"; the object of desire becomes an image of 
one's self, the image of one's self. 
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Mulvey is not the only film theorist to describe identification as integral to the 
cinematic experience. Kaja Silverman, for instance, has also examined the dynamics of 
audience identification, specifically as it is related to an operation undertaken by 
audiences in order to organize the cinematic experience into a meaningful one, an 
operation she has called a suture8• Suture is "the work involved in cinematic 
identifications," according to Judith Halberstam, who discusses Silverman at length. She 
explains: 
Silverman uses 'suture' to identify the relationship between lack or loss [terms 
familiar from Lacan's theory of the subject] and subjectivity within the activity of 
spectatorship. Because there is always something we are denied access to upon 
the screen, always a perspective that cannot be rendered, a shot that reveals only 
the limitations of vision, then, she argues, it is lack that structures our relation to 
cinematic knowledge. (153) 
Identification describes the audience relationship with the cinematic image; the same 
term describes the relationship between infant animal being (the pre-subjective human 
object) and the mirror image upon which subjectivity is subsequently erected. The 
identification takes the form of a suture, an operation of organizing cinematic 
experience---essentially fragmented and incomplete, imagine for instance the various 
"shots" that make up any cinematic scene-into a meaningful whole. 
Think again of the shower scene. Many film critics have commented upon the 
frenetic rapid fire editing of that most famous of death scenes, and in examining it (in 
slow motion no less) I pointed out that there is only one brief image of Norman's knife 
actually touching Marian's body. The image, not quite merely a flicker, occurs is less 
8 Silverman in fact borrows these term from Lacanian psychoanalysis, especially the work of Jacques 
Alain Miller. 
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than a second watching the film at normal speed and it seems motivated more by some 
perverse sexual symbolism than by any real attempt at representing a violent knife attack 
(only the tip of the knife is seen piercing the skin a few inches below her belly button, 
immediately following this image is Marian's breathy "Oh!"). I'm not sure what 
Hitchcock intended with the image, but I'm rather fairly certain he did not intend it to 
bear the full burden of visually representing Marian Crane's murder. No, that task is up to 
the audience and is accomplished via the symbolic mediation of the scene; placing it in 
some narrative, filling in the gaps between images (knife raised, Marian screams, repeat), 
making sense of what is seen. 
In other words, by performing a suture. 
Of course, in Josh's torture scene, the audience is made to adopt a point of view I 
described as analogous to third person limited narration, seeing things from neither 
character's perspective but also not seeing everything that happens. Suturing is necessary 
here also, in order to fit the scene within the film's narrative. The difference in the two 
scenes, and the suturing that takes place in them, is that in Psycho the specific violence of 
the scene is a part of the suture, that is to say it is provided through the audience's 
symbolic mediation. It is not seen. Hostel, on the other hand, displays little but the 
violence of torture, via its images of the instruments, of the torturer (as ultimate 
instrument), of the abattoir (the scene of the torture), and finally through its graphic 
depiction of the physical violence upon Josh's body-the drill driving into his thigh 
(followed by the shot of the drill dropped back on the table top, tangled chunks of bloody 
flesh wrapped round it). It is in attaching these scenes of violent torture to the film's 
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narrative that the suture takes place; the violence is seen. Of course, my point is to detach 
the scenes of violence from the narrative-it is the fact that one can do that and retain 
meaningfulness that separates Josh's torture scene, and much of the violence in 
contemporary horror films, from the type of violence represented in classic horror films. 
Elaine Scarry, you will recall, described torture's primary purpose as one of 
"unmaking" its victim, which I understand (from her attention to the role of language in 
determining one's selfhood) as unmaking the victim's SUbjectivity. It is this function of 
torture that I want to emphasize alongside the analogy of audience-film identification and 
mirror stage identification. If the latter is about the making of a subject through 
identification with an image of a stable, whole body then is the former not potentially 
about reversing that identification? In a violent image from a horror film, especially one 
in which torture is taking place, the audience is forced to identify with an image of a 
stable body coming undone, coming apart, going to pieces. While in the Symbolic 
register the experience of such a scene varies, due to the subordination of the visual 
aspect to the law of symbolization, I suggest that in the Imaginary register the 
experience is consistently one of disintegration. Detaching the scene from the narrative, 
analyzing the scene as pure visual image is key for recognizing this experience, although 
it is not essential for the effect of the experience. 
And what is the effect of this? 
A crack in the foundation of human being, so to speak. Subjectivity constructed 
upon an identification; subjectivity dismantled via identification. The mirror stage in 
21 
reverse. Lacan' s mirror shattered, the image of the stable body splintering, what was 
whole becoming many. 
And what is left for the subject? 
The abyss behind the screen. The inevitable nothing behind the projections, 
images, identifications. The black hole from which signification cannot escape, the void 
of the Symbolic. A void into which the law of symbolization falls, unravels, loses itself 
entirely. Not pure void, not nothingness in an ontological sense, just the nothingness 
outside the Symbolic. In a sense, this is the void of the Real. Shattering the mirror is 
shattering one wall of the Symbolic, opening of a new frontier. If the Symbolic is the 
domain in which "human" being takes place, subjectivity as such is constructed, and if 
this domain is clearly partial in terms of human experience (as the need for other registers 
of experience-the Imaginary and the Real-attests it is), then by expanding upon this 
domain-not by extending the subordinating logic of the domain-but by expanding the 
domain of "human" being, the domain of subjectivity itself, to include aspects of 
subjectivity that have either been occluded from modem forms of subjectivity or discover 
new ones. Either way, the expansion of the possibilities of human being, subjectivity as 
such, seems possible. 
But what is it that suspends audiences over this abyss, making them susceptible to 
its lure of emptiness, exposing them to its nothingness? Why can't the safety of a sutured 
identification attach audience psyches safely on one side or the other of this abyss of 




Imagine a vertical line intersecting a horizontal plane. The scenes of graphic 
violence in contemporary, or postmodern, horror films can be understood as placing their 
victims on this vertical line in relation to the victimizers. The violence takes place with 
the victims in a subordinate position in relation to the victimizer. This subordination of 
the victim is characteristic of a fictional world whose ontology is radically Other in 
comparison to classic, or modern, horror films. This vertical line is a movement away 
from the normal space of modern horror, a descent into psychosis. Hostel is an exemplary 
postmodern horror film. The horizontal plane is the location of the violence in modern 
horror films. The cinematic example par excellence of modern horror is Psycho. The 
move from Psycho to Hostel is a shift from the horizontal plane to the vertical line. 
Now, what does this spatial model, this way of representing the relationship of 
victim to victimizer, tell us about the fictional worlds in which this violence is taking 
place? This model provides a means of locating the victim in the ontology of the fictional 
world, a means of understanding what the victim's relationship is to the perpetrators of 
that violence. And in what way does that relationship bear upon the victim's situation in 
that fictional world? By locating the victims, victimizer and violence on the horizontal 
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plane of modern horror one locates the victim in an ostensibly equal relationship with the 
victimizer. Also, both victims and victimizer are grounded on a plane in which 
"normalcy" is a regulatory concept, defining the victimizer as an aberration. Thus this 
horizontal plane model of ontology, describing the fictional worlds of modern horror, 
represents an ontology in which horror appears aberrant, marginal, Other; ultimately this 
ontology is one in which a fully-fledged bourgeois ideology dominates. The world is 
normal, "we" define normal, and thus "we" define our world in our terms and that which 
does fit into our definition (so the thinking goes), must be deviant. Normalcy reigns, with 
both feet firmly planted on the horizontal plane. 
This equality suggests ontology of normalcy and deviation; what I mean is that 
the victim is (reasonably) normal, and recognizes his or her world to be normal, but 
becomes aware-via the violence enacted by the victimizer-that deviation is the source 
of horror. The victimizer is an aberration, a deviation, an Other not only to the victim but 
also to the very ontology of the fictional world. An even better formulation of this idea is 
to say that while a normal fictional world necessarily needs deviation in order to define 
its normalcy, the deviation must occupy a place of Otherness. The deviation must not be 
the norm, but rather must be that which gives the norm its meaning by its difference. 
Furthermore, the deviation must be contained within the norm, thus the horizontal plane 
as model of this type of ontology: a fixed field of normalcy, with its Other existing in 
scattered pockets within it. Normal and deviant mutually dependent upon each other yes, 
but not in such a way as to establish two equally matched spaces-a binary. Instead, 
24 
deviation has to be de-centered, variously manifested, generally isolated and 
unconnected. 
The victimizer is an aberration. And although normal is defined by contrast with 
abnormal, there is no reason intrinsic to the ontology of the normal fictional world that 
explains why the abnormality of the victimizer expresses itself as horror. The horror 
arises from the circumstances of the aberration. The monster, or victimizer, in modern 
horror films is aberrant in some specific manner that predisposes him, her, or it to horror. 
Dracula and Norman Bates cross over borders of normal but they do this because of who 
or what they are and not because the world in some manner makes this necessary. 
Norman Bates is not normal. He is psycho. He embodies deviation in that he is a 
localized manifestation of deviance (and by that I mean specific to his own 
circumstances) and does not, or cannot, identify with normalcy. He and Marian occupy 
horizontal positions in relation to one another: he is a localized deviant on the stable and 
static plane upon which he and Marian move, he does not identify with normalcy (he may 
identify himself as normal, that is he may think there is nothing wrong or different about 
himself, but the audience knows better) while Marian does (or at least she does from the 
audience perspective). Again, it is worth pointing out how the normal ontological model 
reinforces pseudo-bourgeois notions of aberration as the source of horror, revealing 
modern horror as ultimately a socially conservative ideological apparatus. 
Of course, from a Lacanian perspective psychosis names that condition of 
subjectivity that is absolutely Other to any other subjective state of affairs. Psychosis is 
deviation par excellence. In psychosis a subject is not really a subject in the same manner 
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as other (neurotic) subjects; the Name of the Father, that Master Signifier grounding the 
subject's experience in the Symbolic, is absent, "foreclosed" is how Lacan describes it, 
resulting in a condition in which the psychotic is perpetually submerged in delusion and 
hallucination, in which meaning generates from no fixed point but is always shifting, 
proliferating, taking on new manifestations, always in motion. The psycho is the name of 
these scattered pockets of deviance peppering the normal landscape. 
What is the situation of postmodem horror? 
I described it as a vertical line, one intersecting the plane upon which modem 
horror takes place. Imagine this vertical line intersecting the horizontal plane of a normal 
fictional world precisely at the point where the victim exists, the line separating the 
victim from this normal world, plunging them, along with the victimizer9, into some other 
space not organized in the same manner as what has been called normal. Instead of a 
relationship taking place horizontally, in which the victim always has recourse to the fact 
of normalcy and recognizes the horror befalling him or her as an aberration, in this new 
space the only normalcy is the violent horror of the victimizer. Instead of moving in a 
homologous relationship to one another, as they did on the horizontal plane of modem 
horror, and which implies the victim could move away from the horror of the victimizer, 
in this new space, along this descending line, there is no where to go, no way to get away. 
Victim and victimizer are locked in an embrace of horrific violence. What is this space? 
This is the space of the psychotic. It is the unmediated experience of the psychotic. In 
postmodem horror the psychotic Other that was contained within the horizontal plane of 
9 Monster or psychopath, it all just depends on the film. 
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normalcy breaks loose and submerges the victims in a world defined as a space of 
violence, madness, and horror. 
It is significant that in many postmodern horror films, especially the torture porn 
variety, the violence often takes place in some specifically constructed locale, a place 
that's purpose is to be a site for horror. Now this is different from the older convention of 
the strange, unfamiliar place as site of horror (a convention dating all the way back to 
horror's roots in the literary Gothic: Walpole's The Castle oJOtranto comes to mind). In 
modern horror, and even before, the strange setting was often used as a more or less 
transparent stand-in for the unconscious: labyrinthine dungeons, shadowy castles, dark 
and dangerous forests. These were places the victim undertook a journey to find, a 
metaphorical journey into his or her own mind, as it were, and once there, they 
confronted the horror and then returned. It is easy to see the Joseph Campbell-esque 
quality to this narrative structure. On the other hand, in postmodern horror, although the 
victims still (usually) have to undertake some journey to arrive at the site of horror they 
more often than not do not have to leave the world which they are familiar to get there. In 
other words, the horror takes place not in some exotic (and metaphorically meaningful) 
location but instead right in the most mundane places: an abandoned factory in Hostel, 
certainly reminiscent of an old castle, but much more relevant for the associations of 
ruined industry, failed enterprise, a crumbling edifice of modernity. It is indeed highly 
meaningful that the destruction of human beings takes place in this film at a site built for 
production-the dialectic of Enlightenment in a nutshell. 
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The psychotic defines the ontology of this space; what was deviant is now the 
norm. A reversal has taken place. The very purpose of this space is to provide a setting 
for the violent horror enacted by the victimizer. The victim's relationship to the 
victimizer is now exactly opposite what it was in modern horror: in this new psychotic 
space it is the victimizer that establishes the norm, and the norm is to victimize, therefore 
the victim becomes the aberration. It doesn't take symbols to understand the relationship 
of victim and victimizer in this psychotic space, all it takes is an image of the violence 
that ensues; one reason why this model uses a vertical line, indicating a movement and 
not a static space, in order to describe the ontology of the psychotic world, is to 
emphasize that the worlds of postmodern horror are more or less merely staging grounds 
for the victim and victimizer relationship. The logic of absence and presence, which I 
understand as the logical basis of symbolization, establishes a concrete spatiality of 
defined spaces-thus the horizontal plane of modern horror, a Symbolic place. In lieu of 
that guarantee of definition, lost in the movement of postmodern horror, all that is left is 
flux, movement, proliferation of meaninglessness horror-thus a line. In other words, the 
static defined boundaries of the horizontal model are lost by this descent into an 
uncharted, undefined pure space of psychosis. There is no place for one to stand and get 
one's bearings; there is only the unending fall into violence. 
This is not to lamely say that the fictional world is to blame for the victimizer's 
act-often enough, as in Psycho, it's an appeal to the world as ever-present external 
influence, as a set of conditions that is the excuse for the aberration that results in horror. 
No, to consider the ontology of the fictional worlds of postmodern horror as responsible 
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for the horror is already to misunderstand that it is precisely this fictional world that is 
horror. There is no reason why. In this manner, at least potentially, postmodern horror has 
the capacity to be socially progressive ideological apparatus in that instead of reinforcing 
the notion that the world is normal, it puts that notion into question. Postmodern horror, 
again especially torture porn, displays a world in which the horror is as much a part of it 
as the victims and the victimizers, indeed more a part of it-horror is the rule. 
Marian Crane inhabits identities indicating her subject position is somewhere 
other than the "traditional" female subjectivity of her time and place, and this of course 
does mean that, in a sense, she is not "normal," but this does not mean the world in which 
she exists is one without normalcy-it is normal, after all, to be a little different, to 
deviate from the norm in some small way; this is what is called being an individual. It is 
an entirely different thing indeed to wake up bound to a chair in a dirty room full of 
power tools. The difference is this: in the latter situation there is no recourse to meaning, 
logic, or authority in order to explain or escape impending doom. Josh wakes up in the 
abattoir; Josh dies. It is entirely "normal" that this takes place (the Surgeon has bought 
Josh, after all-what is more normal than disposing of one's property as one sees fit?); 
this death means nothing, it isn't the result of some action, some cause and effect 
sequence, nor can it really be considered a violation of either legal or moral codes. Notice 
how the police are involved with the torture cartel, and also how nice of a man the 
Surgeon is (when he's not operating without anesthesia): he's a family man, quick to 
offer advice and comforting words to a young man in trouble; that is until he gets Josh in 
the abattoir. 
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Norman Bates' horror can be-in fact, it is--explained away, in this case by a 
representative authority on such matters, a psychiatrist. There is no such explanation for 
the Surgeon or any of the other clients in Hostel. They do what they do because they can, 
because they want to; that's reason enough. The pursuit of a personal end, whether it be 
pleasurable gratification, some ethical imperative or merely economic survival, is a 
cornerstone of post-Enlightenment thought ("life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"), 
one that merges well with the capitalist imprimatur. I don't think naIve equivalencies 
between torture porn and capitalism are appropriate, but it appears rather clear that under 
a different set of ideological conditions the problem of motive would remain, making 
postmodern horror, torture porn especially, difficult to imagine. I'm certainly not the first 
to draw conclusions linking capitalist ideology with violence and madness (Anti-Oedipus 
is of course a key text), but it might be in the realm of aesthetic cultural productions that 
such affinities may be most markedly pronounced, most visible. 
Furthermore, and more importantly, this shift from normal to psychotic, from the 
horizontal plane to the vertical line, is a dislocating and disorienting one for the audience, 
resulting in a mode of identification that doesn't allow for the audience to settle on one 
object or another (the victim or the victimizer), leading to short-circuiting of the 
identification process. The modes of viewing with which audiences are most familiar, 
modes based on audience identification with the cinematic apparatus, are inadequate for 
the experience of postmodern horror films. What ends up happening is the collapse of 
symbolizable identification, that is to say identification along the lines of Mulvey's 
model, resulting in an experience of what earlier I called the abyss: the audience 
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continues to identify with the cinematic image, but no longer in the Symbolic register, 
which has fallen away, forming the abyss around which the suture continues to take 
place. The audience sees the image but has no symbolic mediation available to makes 
sense of it. The identification takes place solely in the Imaginary. 
Whereas in a modern horror film the audience may identify with Marian Crane in 
either of the capacities described by Mulvey, scopophilic or narcissistic, or, as is more 
likely the case, in some combination of the two, this identification eventually contributes 
to the horror of the film in the rather obvious manner of the audience witnessing the 
object of identification murdered. In Psycho Marian's murder creates a sort of audience 
identification vacuum, at least momentarily. There are other objects of identification that 
emerge, but part of the Hitchcock's genius in the film is to uncomfortably locate the 
audience, again only for a moment, over an abyss of identification. It is in this moment 
over the abyss that I think identification continues to take place between audience and 
screen image, but just not in any recognizably symbolic manner. 
What I mean is that while Mulvey's models of audience identification depend 
upon symbolic mediation-an object of desire must necessarily fit within a narrative of 
desire, which is, as is the case with any narrative, constituted in the Symbolic1o -and 
therefore cease to operate without it (a scopophilic object ceases to be desired in lieu of a 
narrative of desire) identification, which is after all founded in an act of looking, 
continues unabated. Carol J. Clover recognized this, and for her, in the horror films she 
10 Moreover, desire itself is a result of entry into the Symbolic: the desire for the lost primordial object that 
jumpstarts a subject's experience of language. 
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analyzes, audience identification takes place largely outside the symbolic, more or less in 
purely visual terms. 
Identity is clearly a function of subject position for Clover, with the "killer" (her 
terminology) occupying an identity based upon his or her inter-subjective relationship to 
the other characters, an identity is established through the film's narrative (the identity of 
killer in a film about a killer) but it is via visual markers, or to say this another way, it is 
in the way the killer "looks" (both the killer's physical appearance and act of looking) 
that marks him or her as such. Clover describes the killer position as feminized male, and 
Norman Bates is clearly an example, but her own examples include, among others, 
Leatherface (the chainsaw as prosthetic phallus) and Buffalo Bill (the full-on 
transsexual). These examples are the same ones taken up by Judith Halberstam. 
For her audience identification is also not limited to the channels established by 
the film's narrative; The Silence of the Lambs, for instance, uses various means to 
facilitate a sutured identification across several objects in the film, most notably FBI 
agent Clarice Starling, convicted psychopath Hannibal Lecter, and finally, transsexual 
serial murderer Buffalo Bill. In identifying with these various objects audiences are 
exposed to sometimes contradictory sets of characteristics: Starling is vulnerable 
"daughter" to Lecter's domineering "father," Lecter is "powerless" in his incarceration 
while Starling is in a position of power thanks to her official authority, Buffalo Bill is a 
deranged monster while Lecter is calm, cool and collected detective, and so on. The film 
plays with the shifting identities of its characters, explicitly constructing identity as an 
effect of inter-subjectivity. At some point it becomes less clear that the audience 
32 
experiences various subject positions shuttling through multiple identities and not, on the 
contrary, a single subject position pulsating with wildly divergent identity-possibilities. 
For Halberstam new possibilities for subjectivity emerge in the sutured identification 
taking place in relation to these shifting subject positions, or rather in relation to the 
roiling void of fluid identities these positions have become. The relation between 
audience and cinematic image, at least in postmodern horror films, is, for her, one of 
surface and appearance. There is no depth, only the horror of a void covered by the 
thinnest of membranes: the screen or the skin, either way it is the surface upon which the 
audience gaze must settle, a surface that is anything but settled. 
Her book is titled Skin Shows, and she explains the title in Chapter Seven, 
"Skinflick: Posthuman Gender in 10hnathan Demme's Silence of the Lambs,": 
Skin is at once the most fragile of boundaries and the most stable of signifiers; it 
is the site of entry for the vampire, the signifier of race for the nineteenth-century 
monster. Skin is precisely what does not fit; Frankenstein sutures his monster's 
ugly flesh together by binding it in a yellow skin, too tight and too thick. When, in 
the modern horror movie, terror rises to the surface, the surface itself becomes a 
complex web of pleasure and danger; the surface rises to the surface, the surface 
becomes Leatherface, becomes Demme's Buffalo Bill, and everything that rises 
must converge. (163) 
The surface is the object of gaze. Many postmodern horror films, especially the 
torture porn films, revel in surface level grotesquerie; not too many of these films spend 
much time dwelling on the deeper effects of their violence, that is to say the emotional or 
psychological effects, except in the most glancing of ways (I'm thinking of the famous 
ending of Hooper's original Texas Chainsaw Massacre in which Sally begins to laugh 
hysterically as she escapes). Emotional depth of character in these films isn't required, 
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and in fact it is surprising just how flat most characters in these films are; Josh in Hostel 
has a couple of moments in which some psychological depth is implied, but these scenes 
are constructed in such a way as to mark Josh as weird and self-obsessed, and not to build 
his character. It's just as well since he meets his grisly fate about halfway into the film. 
Paxton's characterization, on the other hand, comes through his actions and the one real 
attempt to establish emotional depth with him-his reminisce about a drowning girl-is 
so blatantly foreshadowing as to be almost laughable. The victims are superficially 
objects of scopophilic identification, although their flatness and inevitably grisly demise 
makes identification with them, in any other manner than visual identification, difficult. 
Already it is clear that audience identification with victims in torture porn films is 
based upon a surface level identification, that is to say with a relationship of looking at 
these bodies before, during and after they are mutilated and killed. Furthermore, the 
situation of the victimizer, and the worlds in which these films take place, is such as to 
foreclose on audience identification in advance. The victimizer and the fictional world, as 
I have been explaining, can be described as pure movement into an un-defined 
(indefinable) space of psychosis, the absolute rupture with the Symbolic order and the 
law of symbolization, the law of absence and presence, an absolute difference of 
experience. The audience cannot fully identify with the victimizer as the latter exists 
outside the space of identification in which the audience finds itself. The psychotic resists 
all symbolization; it is via symbolic mediation, i.e. a narrative of desire, that scopophilic 
identification takes place. The victimizer then is left as an object of narcissistic 
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identification. But this situation is problematic, too: audiences tend to resist identifying 
themselves with the psycho sadist victimizers. 
As Clover demonstrated, simple equivalency of audience and victimizer is bluntly 
crude, missing the nuanced manner in which (mostly young male) audiences identify 
with cross-gendered subject positions displayed in horror films. This is to say that 
dismissing audiences of torture porn horror films as sadistic sorely misses the point. 
Identification takes place with both victim and victimizer (this is Clover and 
Halberstam's point); what happens in many recent horror films, however, is that in 
lacking any proper symbolic means of settling upon an object, or even settling upon a 
relationship between objects (which is how Clover and Halberstam finally describe 
identification: a relationship of identification oscillating between two objects of various 
signification), the audience's experience of identification must take place in the 
Imaginary. This is why the experience is analogous to the mirror stage. 
This dislocation of audience is partially the result of the shift that has taken place 
over the years from Psycho to Hostel, the shift from one fictional world ontology to 
another, the move from the horizontal plane to the vertical line of psychosis. What is this 
shift? It is a change in cultural awareness, in the cultural perception of horror films. A 
transformation in the function of horror films, the social function, one that indicates an 
awareness on the one hand of a different set of expectations (on the part of audiences) 
and, on the other, a different set of needs. Horror films have begun to different kinds of 
cultural work. 
Take Psycho for instance. 
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It's clear that I interpret that film as taking place in some version of a normal 
world, a world not very different from the one in which I, as audience member, find 
myself in. The film is uncomfortable perhaps, but not likely to upset my confidence in the 
reality of the normal that I encounter everyday. But subsequently horror films began to 
migrate into far more unsettling fictional worlds. 
Wood, in his description of apocalyptic horror films in the 1970's, is for the most 
part, describing films that take place in this new ontological space. Texas Chainsaw 
Massacre is one of Wood's primary examples; therefore it is fitting that the recent 
remakes of Tobe Hooper's early confrontation with late capitalism are exemplary of this 
most recent trend in horror, torture porn. It is in this manner that the shift in the genre, in 
the form, cinematic horror, can be best seen: the socio-historic circumstances of an 
emerging aesthetic cultural production provide the condition for particular content, which 
appears more or less latently beneath the manifest conventions of the genre at that 
moment. Whereas the original Texas Chainsaw Massacre was an art film masquerading 
as horror the more recent versions, Texas Chainsaw Massacre (2003) and Texas 
Chainsaw Massacre: The Beginning (2006), are more or less sadistic revels in the 
unmaking of bodies, young people torn apart on the implements of a carnivorous age. 
Psycho then does not inaugurate this shift. It is not until the end of the 1960's, and 
George Romero's Night of the Living Dead, that the shift began. From a monster-
centric horror, which implies a normal world unfortunately inhabited by aberrant 
monsters, to a diffuse, generalized and de-centered horror, in which the monsters are no 
longer aberrations, this is the arc of contemporary horror films. Night of the Living Dead 
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invites its audience to locate its horror not so much in the monsters but in the world in 
which such monsters may exist. For example, the zombie epidemic is never explained. 
There is no answer for why the dead rise and feed on the living; moreover, it is 
significant that motive or cause is not even an issue in the film. Although the question is 
raised-apparently more from the pressing need of verisimilitude than from any earnest 
gesture at explanation-Night of the Living Dead proceeds just fine without answers. 
What is most interesting about the film, and perhaps the reason for its immediate 
critical success II, is that the group's demise is less due to the zombies than their own 
inability to cooperate. If the zombies are the world, in the sense of representing a 
psychotic, victimizing world, hostile and on the attack, beating down the door, then the 
fate of the group is clearly a precursor to that which befalls victims in today's horror 
films-the ontologically psychotic world cannot be overcome, there is no escape, and not 
even one's best efforts are enough. Even Ben, the sole survivor of the zombie carnage, 
ends up dead. 
The nihilism of Night of the Living Dead was taken up and amplified in the 
following years. Low budget horror films flourished. Many filmmakers set out to make 
films that were shocking or controversial, and often violence was the means of achieving 
that result. At the same time, many of these same filmmakers were inspired by Romero 
and consciously set out to make politically meaningful films. This was the era of horror 
films celebrated by Robin Wood in his "Introduction to the American Horror Film." 
Several films by Wes Craven, especially his work in the 1970' s, are exemplary of the 
11 Immediate critical success overseas, I should say. The film was a sensational hit in Europe, while 
domestically, at first at least, it was merely a sensation. 
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kind of horror that was being spawned then: Last House on the Left (1972) and The Hills 
Have Eyes (1977) are two films in which brutality, both in terms of the on-screen 
violence and the nihilism ofthe film's narrative, far exceed previous films. Craven's 
recurring motif of the violence within normal people-the grief-stricken parents of Last 
House, for example-is a means of representing one of my basic premises: violence has 
the capacity for subjective transformation. In fact, a later Craven film, 1984's A 
Nightmare on Elm Street, explicitly links subject position and identity with graphic 
It is not possible to painstakingly chart the shift in horror films from the modem 
model of normality, on the one hand, the horizontal space of horror in which the 
victimizer represents an aberration, best represented by Psycho and, on the other, the 
postmodem model of psychosis, the vertical descent of victims into the psycho world of 
violence, represented in this essay by Hostel. I have only elaborated upon this distinction 
in order to explain the dislocated audience experience of identification in postmodem 
horror, an experience that contributes to these films' subversive potential. 
I have been describing a model of thinking about horror films that allows for a 
distinction between the fictional worlds of Psycho and Hostel. The distinction is one of 
ontology, a difference in the kind of being in these fictional worlds. The purpose of this 
distinction is to demonstrate another basic difference in the modem and postmodem 
12 For instance, when one young victim asks the film's supernatural villain, Freddy Krueger, who he is 
instead of answering, or even speaking at all, Krueger deliberately (and in medium close-up) cuts off a pair 
of his fingers. His name, it appears, is less a marker of who he is than the simple fact of violence. It is also 
significant that supernatural monster Freddy Krueger is "created," so to speak, in the film via violence-he 
had been, in life, a child molester who met a violent end at the hands of angry parents. Only through 
violence could the character of the film come into existence. 
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varieties of horror film, which, in my view, is the difference between, on one hand, an 
audience's capacity to identify with the victims, to recognize some version of the world 
in which they-the audience-imagine themselves to live, a normal world in which 
aberration is the source of horror and, on the other hand, the foreclosure of that capacity. 
The psychotic world of postmodern horror dislocates the audience, does not allow 
identification (at least not in the same way as modern horror did), and, in the particular 
genre of postmodern horror best represented by Hostel, torture porn, the film actually 
demonstrates to the audience that the locus of subjectivity, the body itself, is nothing but 
a fragile vulnerability waiting to be undone. The violent image of torture is a potent one 
when one considers to what extent subjectivity relies upon the Imaginary identification 
with an external body. The dislocation of audience identification creates the condition in 
which the transference of a new subjectivity is possible by not allowing for identification 
to take place in a "safe," symbolically mediated manner, but instead forcing identification 
to take place in an entirely different register. 
I am arguing that fictional representations of violence, such as those depicted in 
horror films, are subversive to subjectivity as it has been constructed in the advanced 
capitalist Western cultures. The subversion is the consequence of an at least three distinct 
things: the inverted mirror stage effect, the dislocation of audience identification, and the 
"unmaking" effect of torture. 
This subversion begins with the audience experience of violence in these films, 
the visual experience of witnessing this violence as an image. The representation of 
violence in films-and not just in horror films-has become increasingly graphic since 
39 
the 1960's, becoming, somewhat paradoxically, both more realistic and impossibly 
garish. Certainly this trend towards more intense graphic representation of violence in 
films can be partially explained by advances in special effects technology and some sense 
of competitive one-upmanship on the part of film makers, as John McCarty argues in 
Splatter Movies. But I think this trend can also be explained by indicating an 
unconsciously perceived need to unsettle the Imaginary foundations of subjectivity, a 
sense that subjectivity is not adequate for the contemporary experience of the Real, that 
in some sense the models of subjectivity have in fact failed. The trend towards increasing 
graphic violence is a solicitation of new subjectivity. Robin Wood discusses how 
widespread feelings of a "generalized crisis in ideological confidence ... habitually 
rendered, of course, in terms of personal drama and individual interaction, and not 
necessarily consciously registered" mark the American cinema ofthe 1970's, and it is my 
contention that realizing the inadequacy of subjectivity is a part of this crisis (Wood 
Hollywood 44, my emphasis). 
The second part of this subversion is due to the inability for the audience to 
identify with the films, or more precisely with the contents of the films. The problem of 
closing a suture around always shifting objects that already dynamically resist 
identification is that the wound is never properly closed, the stitches can't pull the frayed 
ends of an audience psyche tight enough, the abyss behind the screen hangs open and 
waiting, always around the edges, menacing potential. Language fails in these persistent 
gaps. The image remains. The image always remains. Contemporary subjectivity, which 
is to say modern subjectivity, which is to say even more precisely say post-
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Enlightenment, post-Hegelian, advanced capitalist globally technologically mediated and 
connected subjectivity, the subjectivity of 2007, Y ouTube and 24-hour news networks, is, 
despite all of its accoutrements, essentially incapable of living for long in the world. 
Late in life Freud wrote "Man has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic God," 
an amplified human being more capable of situating him or herself in the world thanks to 
"advances in civilization" (738). Technology held the promise of transforming human 
being, but Freud was too much a thinker of his dark Victorian times to settle on whether 
such transformation would tend towards amelioration or annihilation. My model of 
subjectivity and identity is analogous to Freud's notion of human beings as prosthetic 
Gods: I imagine the human animal being donning a shell called subjectivity, necessary 
for any inter-subjective, that is to say social, experience; the shell is capable of 
accommodating more or less identities depending upon its process of construction, that is 
to say the subjectivation that has gone into its making. The subversion of subjectivity I 
have described is not, strictly speaking, destruction: there is no condition of non-
subjectivity. Instead the subversion functions as modification. Imagine a shell covered 
with electrical outlets; each outlet is where an identity plugs in. Some shells have more 
outlets than others, some have different kinds than others. Subversion of subjectivity 
means that the basic structure of this shell is affected in such a manner as to allow for a 
re-constitution that may result in increased capacity for identity. 
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THE SUBJECT 
I present a theory of subjectivity and identity that synthesizes Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theories of the subject with Foucault's concept of technologies of 
subjectivity, as these concepts have been taken up and modified by feminist scholars, 
such as Carol J. Clover, Barbara Creed, Judith Halberstam, and Linda Williams, working 
specifically with horror films. This synthesis will allow me to argue that subjectivity is 
the result of a process that is not fixed but is in fact dynamic and ongoing; any given 
subject's condition of subjectivity is determined not only by entry into the Symbolic 
register of experience, what Lacan described variously as submission to the law of 
symbolization, to the Name of the Father, or to the Master Signifier, but also by the 
continuing mediation of various technologies of sUbjectivity that operate throughout 
culture. It is this dynamism of subjectivity that allows for a re-imagining of the subject, 
once it is established how some of these technologies, in this case, the aesthetic 
technology of cinema, actually de-stabilize subjectivity and then, in conjunction with the 
very specific technology of the modern monster (as described by Halberstam) provide 
new alternatives. 
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My understanding of subjectivity and identity corresponds to Gad Horowitz's 
description of basic and surplus repression. Drawing on Marcuse, Horowitz states: 
Repression is also essential for the development of the human person, the self-
conscious subject, and for the maintenance of culture-not only "bad," 
"repressive" culture, but any culture whatsoever, human culture as such. 
Repression cannot be understood as an extraneous force which impinges on a 
preformed human nature and ... either restrains ... or perverts ... [n]or is repression 
only an inherent flaw, an unavoidable weakness in human nature. The repression 
discovered by Freud is constitutive of human as distinguished from animal nature. 
(2) 
He goes on to cite Althusser's claim that repression "transforms a small animal conceived 
by a man and a woman into a small human child" (Althusser, quoted in Horowitz 2). This 
is exactly the distinction I will make, referring to Lacan, in regards to subjectivity as a 
result of language. 
Foucault argued that human beings are inevitably processed into normalized and 
productive social beings through various technologies of subjectivity, which he referred 
to as technologies of the self. Foucault deployed this idea in his various genealogical 
explorations of modern social practice. Judith Halberstam, my source for the terminology 
"technology of subjectivity," used Foucault's ideas in her study of Gothic fiction, 
modifying Carol J. Clover's approach to gender in horror films, in order to argue that the 
modern monster (her primary examples include Dracula, Leatherface, and Buffalo Bill) is 
an aesthetic technology capable of generating new, alternative versions of subjectivity. 
For both Foucault and Halberstam, these technologies operate in specific cultural 
circumstances, and they can take on various forms. These processes are as various as the 
culture in which they appear. Some of the more obvious technologies of subjectivity can 
be found in education systems, religious institutions, and family structures as well as in 
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other, more aesthetic cultural productions. These technologies operate both discursively 
and non-discursively. For Foucault, one very important technology was the rhetoric of the 
proper care of the self. It is Halberstam who takes this idea of technologies into the 
aesthetic domain, arguing first of all that the literary Gothic genre constituted one such 
technology, one generating alternative subject positions, and further that as the Gothic 
genre eventually lost its technological function it was taken up by the modern monster so 
that today it is the body of the monster that functions as a technology of alternative 
SUbjectivity. For her horror, being the natural domain of the modern monster, is rich with 
possibilities for changing the manner in which human beings experience themselves. 
Theorists of horror have often stressed that the monster, in whatever guise it 
takes, is essentially a metaphor for otherness, and in fact one common method of reading 
horror has been to trace the vector's of a given monster's otherness through the socio-
historic matrix from which it emerged or within which it has gained particular currency. 
Wood, for instance, lists at least eight terms that could potentially be other in the horror 
films of the 1970' s, including women, children, ethnic groups and the proletariat (Wood 
169-170). Halberstam explains "The monster functions as monster. .. when it is able to 
condense as many fear-producing traits as possible into one body" (21). Furthermore, she 
describes the monster's "remarkably mobile, permeable, and infinitely interpretable 
body ... is a machine that... produces meaning and can represent any horrible trait the 
reader feeds into the narrative" (21). The monster came to possess these remarkable 
function of multiplicity at the dawn of the 20th century, indicating for Halberstam that the 
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horror genre's ability to "take the imprint of any number of interpretations makes it a 
hideous offspring of capitalism itself' (3). 
To restate the point in the terms of this essay, Halberstam describes the monster 
as occupying a subject position compatible with multiple identities, capable of becoming 
socialized in a variety of ways-the monster, in various circumstances, can be many 
things to many people. The monster is marked as such by a multiplicity due to its 
subjectivity being capable of supporting a wide variety of identity, a radical multiplicity. 
What this means is that the monster has the ability to generate horror in any number of 
situations precisely because as a subject it is not limited to a particular set of identities-
Dracula, for instance, is "otherness itself... monster and man, feminine and powerful, 
parasitical and wealthy; he is repulsive and fascinating, he exerts the consummate gaze 
but he is scrutinized in all things, he lives forever but he can be killed" (Halberstam 88). 
It should be noted how her list of identities contains many contradictions: Dracula, for 
instance, is both immortal and vulnerable, all too capable of dying. Here is a subject that 
can be written in a variety of ways 13, and not all ofthem add up to coherence and 
stability. The monster is therefore a model of alternative SUbjectivity. 
Subjectivity establishes the possibilities of human social being; identity defines 
that social being. Although it is not my intention to catalogue the variety of processes of 
subjectivation, nor to even attempt the futile task of describing the multiple ways in 
which identities are formed, I do want to point out that since I understand subjectivation 
13 It is precisely this multiplicity that Halberstam describes as the characteristic distinction from earlier, 
Romantic Gothic fiction (Walpole, Radcliffe, and Lewis, for example) and modern horror fiction (Dracula 
is the exemplary modern horror fiction for Halberstam). As for my own distinctions with horror film, I use 
classic and modern interchangeably to denote films up to and including Psycho and continuing for some 
time afterwards while I use contemporary or postmodern to refer to films since 1985. 
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to be a continuous process, it might seem difficult to distinguish between a process or 
technology that affects sUbjectivity and one that affects identity. Where does basic 
repression end and surplus repression begin? There are indeed two sets of processes at 
work here, and since some of the terminology of my sources differs from my own I must 
make some remark about this distinction. 
Not all of what Foucault described as technologies of the self would be 
technologies of subjectivity to me; some would have to be technologies of identity. While 
dwelling too long upon this fine distinction of terminology would definitely lead us 
astray I think it is necessary to quickly acknowledge that I am indeed borrowing ideas 
and modifying them. Finally, as for deciding whether a technology is one of subjectivity 
or identity I have generally asked this question: is what is at stake some sense of the 
possibilities of human social being or is what is at stake merely one instance, one form, of 
social being? Answering the latter indicates a technology of identity. 
Subjectivity is, in my view, that condition in which a human being must first enter 
in order to first of all recognize him or herself as a human being, to be recognized by 
others as such, and in order to assume identity. Identity is the prerequisite of social being, 
and subjectivity is the prerequisite of identity. Therefore subjectivity is first of all the 
condition in which a human social being must be made. I distinguish the pre-subjective 
human being as an animal being, a human object, while it is only after subjectivation that 
I think we can properly speak of human being, a human subject. A subject as such is like 
the blank pages of book, waiting to be filled with content. That content, that which 
specifically identifies a subject as such and such, is what constitutes a subject's identities. 
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This content becomes the "I" of (inter)subjective discourse. The "I" is the specific 
identity (male or female, ethnic or racial, socio-economic class, etc) adopted in a specific 
situation by the subject. Subjectivity, analogous to the book in which blank pages are 
filled with identity-making content, is the locus of any given human being's identities. 
As I conceive it subjectivity, although not the most basic of ontological 
categories, is the basic sociological category and as such is to be itself recognized as a 
social product l4 • I do not mean social product in the naive sense that specific individuals 
are products of their social experience, but instead in the twofold sense that subjectivity 
as such is a consequence of the social idea-it is necessary for social formation-and that 
subjectivity is produced by various social, or more precisely cultural, means. These 
means have been described as technologies in the sense that they are specific sets of 
techniques. These techniques function as guidelines for the self, establishing the subject 
as such in a condition in which identity is then possible. Deborah Cook explains, "the 
subject is ... not pregiven, ... waiting to be discovered. When Foucault speaks of the 
formation of the subject, he means ... the subject does not exist as a determinate form with 
specific qualities before the practices that make up the rappart a soi in different historical 
periods bring it into being" (Cook, quoted in Olssen 31). 
The need to separate subjectivity from identity is apparent. This distinction is 
necessary in order to discuss subjectivity within a psychoanalytic framework while not 
14 The most basic ontological category would therefore be the fact of organic human being, a human being 
as a flesh and blood creature. This distinction between the organic human being and social human being 
recalls Heidegger's use of "earth' and 'world' as two distinct ontological categories (see "On the Origin of 
the Work of Art"). What this amounts to is a tri-partite division of human experience: the pre-subjective 
animal being, the subject, and finally the identity, each one superimposing upon the previous. I think we 
must begin with the biological facticity of the organism, before moving to the psychic pre-condition for 
social being and finally to the various manners in which humans manifest as such socially. 
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ignoring the obvious effects of social processes that shape, guide, and create human 
beings. Identity is an effect of social order, a necessary fiction of sorts, contingent upon 
interest and ideology. Moreover, any single subject has multiple identities. Identity can 
always be plural, but not infinitely so; there are, so to speak, more or less blank pages in 
different subjects, and it is in this variety that difference in technologies of sUbjectivity 
may be assumed. All subjects are not created equally - just as there as differences in 
identity so too there are differences in subjectivity, differences in the kind of subject 
produced by the process of subjectivation. These differences indicate variety in the 
processes of subjectivation. 
For example, a subject that is compatible with more than one sexual identity has 
probably undergone subjectivation through a different means, or has had a different 
experience of subjectivation, than a subject for whom a single sexual identity is 
imperative. Sexuality and subjectivity enjoy a special relationship which will become 
more clear later. Some processes are more influential- Mark Olssen claims that 
"through ... [formal] education the dominant epistemological matrix is internalized" 
(Olssen 30). Other processes aren't available to everyone. 
What this means is that while subjectivity involves one's reflexive awareness of 
self and others-it is a psychic phenomenon-identity is the form in which that subject 
becomes socialized. Identities exist as social performative acts 15, while subjectivity is the 
initial condition that allows social experience to take place. Identities are made possible 
via subjectivity; furthermore, the content and multiplicity of identity derives from 
15 Even one's own self-identity since it too is still a relationship that draws upon social experience, i.e., one 
understands one's self in relation to one's inter-subjective relationships. 
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subjectivity. Which is to say that the number of pages, and what can be written on those 
pages, varies and is dependent upon the specific processes of subjectivation. 
The variety of processes of subjectivation are responsible for this variety in 
subjectivity. But this variety must not be imagined to be too great. After all, since 
subjectivity is the basic sociological category of being it follows that the subjects of a 
given time and place, a particular socio-historic moment in a given society, must share 
some traits that allow for them to coexist socially in the first place. Normalcy is the 
operative concept here. Foucault argued that the increasing technologies of self he 
uncovered in the various discourses of public and private health, mental health, sexuality, 
and other human sciences in the modern era were all bent on normalizing subjects to the 
needs of their contemporary social group. I understand normalization then to be activity 
in subjectivation that perpetuates homogenous subject traits of a given time and place. 
Normalization is therefore the basic process of reproducing a given social episteme. 
Normalcy is a social definition and not grounded in biological fact. Normalcy is a 
function of social necessity. Normalcy is ideology. Furthermore, it seems that 
constructing subjectivity along these lines can result in a problem of adequacy. If 
subjectivity is constructed upon specific socio-historic principles in service of particular 
ideological interests then it is possible, if not likely, that this type of subjectivity may not 
be adequately built to accommodate the subject in a world that is not entirely determined 
by the interests of that particular ideology. 
In Psycho Marian's identities indicate some slippage between pre-feminist 
normalized subjectivity, which I take to be the "traditional" (which is to say defined 
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exclusively in terms of patriarchy) female subject position, and some other kind of 
subjectivity, not quite feminist (perhaps proto-feminist?), characterized by her 
willingness to steal from her (male) boss and strike out on her own (the unaccompanied 
female traveler being a somewhat scandalous idea in the "traditional" view). Marian 
frequents motels. This fact of her character is a consequence of the plot, yes, but I think it 
also indicates an anti-domesticity in Marian; after all, what kind of space could be more 
anti-domestic than a motel room? It is a lodging that is not one's home, sheltering but not 
a place of dwelling, home-like but not home. In that way, the space of the motel is an 
uncanny one, in the literal sense of Freud's term. Marian seems not to have a home, in a 
sense. She seems at home, as it were, in uncanny spaces. Even more so she herself seems 
a bit uncanny. She's on the run, towards a new and better life, but of course its only death 
she finds out on the highway. 
It might be rather obvious to point out Psycho's hostility toward Marian as an un-
"traditional" female subject, but consider how her un-"traditional"-ness marks her as 
uncanny. She seems the very picture of female subjectivity-an object of the male gaze, 
an object of male pleasure, a servant of male desire (think of the scene in which her boss' 
client flirts clumsily with her-its like an almost laughable sexual harassment training 
film!), and yet... yet she's not. Marian, like Norman, isn't exactly what she appears. 
Somewhere in her subjectivation new spaces opened up, blank pages were added, 
allowing Marian identities not possible for her flatly dull co-worker (it's striking how 
glazed over the co-worker seems in comparison to Marian). The film does not explore 
what may have caused Marian's subjective difference; it is too busy planning on 
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destroying her because of it. By analyzing her character through the lens of my 
subjectivity and identity model and determining that Marian's identities betray a 
subjectivity different from "traditional," pre-feminist female subject positions, I can posit 
that Hitchcock's film is conservative in its drive to eradicate Marian. From a 
contemporary perspective it is easy to see the film's social politics as reactionary and 
dogmatic, in the sense that it ignores the fact that female subjectivity is already 
undergoing transformations that makes Marian's un-"traditional" identities possible, and 
that it tries to enforce a patriarchal code on this female subject who is apparently already 
escaping such a code. Psycho either demonstrates the incoherence of such a dominating 
patriarchy (thereby escaping the full brunt of being labeled conservative) or it articulates 
it; take your pick, depending upon how one understands the confusing of male and 
female subjectivity in Norman, the condition of his madness, determines how one will 
understand the film. 
In Hostel the relationship of subjectivity and identity is even more pronounced. 
The film goes out of its way in establishing specific identities for its two American 
protagonists, Josh and Paxton. The audience first sees these two smoking pot in an 
Amsterdam hash house. Later they are trolling for sex in nightclubs, drinking, getting into 
fights, and just generally causing a ruckus. At one point people are raining bottles down 
on them. These identities are variations on stereotypes of young adult American male 
behavior, and Josh and Paxton are identified as basically crass and hedonistic, typical 
frat -brother-gone-wild kinds of guys, with little in the way of redeeming qualities about 
them. They are both cardboard cut-outs, with little other than one basic distinction-Josh 
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is the dreamy writer working on his thesis while Paxton is in law school-that separates 
them as characters. That distinction, significantly delivered via dialogue (in a kind of pep 
talk from Paxton to Josh), is the means of describing these characters in terms of their 
subjectivity. In fact, one way of viewing the film is to take into account the manner in 
which various identities fit the two American characters. They are given differing subject 
positions, the writer and the attorneyl6, each with its own capacity for different identities. 
They are put in similar situations, in which they must take on various identities in order 
to survive, and it is quite instructive of the film's implicit political meaning to pay 
attention to which subject position fares better. The rest of the film, from that 
subjectivity-defining pep talk onward, can be read as mapping which of these subject 
positions is more likely to survive in this nightmarish fictional world. 
It is in this manner that the film can be read as a smart revision of Bret Easton 
Ellis' American Psycho: in the latter, capitalism has created the monster that is Patrick 
Bateman, and the audience is invited inside Bateman's world in order to be shown just 
how normal (even ideal) of a capitalist he really is, Patrick is capitalism realized, while in 
Hostel capitalism has created the conditions in which one either fully inhabits the 
capitalist identity, which is still brutal and associated with a willingness to kill, or one 
perishes. In American Psycho Bateman is a cautionary example of pure capitalism. In 
Hostel one must become Bateman in order to survive. 
Identity is clearly a choice in Hostel. Paxton understands the limitations of 
particular identities, or the manner in which particular identities work (or do not work) in 
16 These two professions represent, in Hostel, the distinction between idealism and solipsism (this 
is a pairing made by the film), on the one hand, and rational worldly engagement on the other. I should 
point out as well that the film marks Paxton as definitively capitalist. 
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particular social situations. At least he understands this far better than Josh. Paxton, as is 
revealed in his pep talk speech to Josh, is clearly aware that social situation is solely the 
relevant factor in determining identity; in effect, he tells Josh to pretend to be interested 
in partying with sexually available European women at the disco, to adopt an identity that 
will let him at least seem to be having fun. Negotiating the moment is Paxton's utmost 
concern, here as in other places in the film, and as such I think it is safe to describe that 
attention to the needs of the present as a component of his fundamentally capitalist 
subject position. 
Furthermore, identity is explicitly linked with appearance. In the Amsterdam 
nightclub Paxton points out Josh's fanny pack faux pas: wearing the practical if 
unfashionable fanny pack identifies Josh as "gay," to use Paxton's terminology, and leads 
to a couple of young women dismissing the duo's come on. Identity is contlated with 
appearance even more explicitly during Paxton's escape from the abattoir. After a 
particularly harrowing escape from his torturer (involving a ball gag, chainsaw, and 
severed fingers), Paxton must decide how to disguise himself so he can escape from the 
abattoir compound17. First he dresses in the garb of a torturer, donning a full length 
leather apron, long gloves, and a bizarre, quasi-medieval horned mask. Clearly Paxton is 
using appearance, specifically his clothes, as a means of inhabiting an identity. But this 
identity doesn't work for him, it doesn't fit. This is an identity that he cannot take on. He 
quickly changes out of it. 
17 Which is in, as the audience has finally found out, housed in an abandoned factory complex. 
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After a sequence in which Paxton descends to the compound's lower level-the 
furnace room in which the remains of victims are incinerated-he finally finds his way 
(how convenient!) into the room in which the torturers change clothes. It is here, in this 
room and in this scene, that Hostel reaches it critical apex in the confrontation between 
Paxton and another American, this one a client. Paxton has already donned a suit he 
found hanging in an unlocked locker, so when the other American comes in (he has just 
changed out of his regular clothes and wears the de rigueur apron of the torturers) he 
thinks Paxton is someone like him, which is to say a successful (and rich) businessman. 
The clothes make the man, in this case. It is significant that it is only after Paxton sheds 
the garb of a college boy on Bacchanalia and dons the attire of a businessman, that is to 
say the attire of a capitalist, that is when he is able to escape. But he not only escapes, he 
wreaks vengeance, killing not only the other American client but also the young women 
responsible for luring him to the agency, the guy back in Amsterdam who first suggested 
he and Josh travel to Slovakia (that guy just happens to have arrived in Slovakia and is 
hanging out in the street with the young women when Paxton comes driving up-talk 
about bad luck!), and finally, the man from the train, the Surgeon. 
It is this last killing in which Paxton fully assumes his identity as capitalist: 
presenting the torture cartel's business card first of all, "Look, I have one too," he seems 
to be saying, before taking a razor blade to him. This is the film's key murder, the one in 
which Paxton gets his hands dirty (oddly enough, despite all the blood, Paxton's suit 
looks immaculate when he's finished), the one in which Paxton fully inhabits the 
capitalist identity required in order to survive-this is what I referred to earlier as the 
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necessity of becoming Patrick Bateman. Paxton kills because he has to, but it is clear 
from the staging of this last murder, that there is pleasure involved in killing. Whether 
this is the pure pleasure of capitalist violence or merely revenge the film leaves 
unanswered. 
In Psycho the audience has Marian and Norman as their viewing objects: classic 
victim and victimizer. In Hostel there's Josh and the Surgeon. This relationship is more 
problematic than the other. First of all Josh recognizes the Surgeon as the man on the 
train to Slovakia, the eccentric who ate his salad with his trembling fingers, explaining he 
liked to have a close relationship with his food. He had laid his hand on Josh's thigh at 
one point in the conversation (they were side by side on the train seat) and Josh freaked 
out, erupting in an exaggerated bravado of homophobic retaliation. At that point the man 
retreated, leaving Josh to fend off the ridicule of his companions. But then, later in the 
film, once Josh is in the midst of his faux-existential angst over the lost girlfriend he runs 
into the man at the nightclub, at which point he insists on buying the man a drink and 
sitting with him, ignoring the uber hot Euro-babe who's lured him to the nightclub just to 
drug him for the torture cartel. Josh so fully enacts the reconciliatory male identity in this 
scene that he actually re-enacts the initial gesture of contact, reaching out and touching 
the man's thigh, a gesture met with an unreadable gaze, a shadow of madness that will 
fall across the man's face the next time Josh sees him, which is in the dungeon abattoir. 
He's bewildered, of course, when he wakes up later in the abattoir with the man, but there 
is also a moment in which he seems to entertain the possibility that this is in fact some 
strange homosexual tryst, and that his earlier eruption of homophobia was in fact 
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warranted. This moment passes quickly. There is quite a bit of homosexual tension, latent 
homosexuality Freud might have said, at work in Josh. Of course, the older man-younger 
man dynamic, made especially clear during the nightclub scene in which Josh is 
counseled by the man, parallels a father-son or even teacher-student relationship but I 
think the manner in which the film emphasizes physical contact between the two of them, 
and the transgressive-ness of this contact, it is the homosexual relation that is ultimately 
most stressed. And its worth mentioning that yes, it's the same thigh initially touched by 
the man on the train that is pierced by the drill. 
In Hostel sex and violence do not co-exist in the way in which they do in Psycho. 
Recognition, a basic component of sexual experience, is denied Marian Crane during her 
death scene; her experience is one of death and only death, regardless of the meaning of 
the act for Norman. She has no way of knowing her killer is a man sexually aroused by 
her. In fact, from her point of view, she is killed by a mad woman. Josh, on the other 
hand, recognizes his killer. The Surgeon removes his mask, becoming the man from the 
train, the man from the night club, the man who may have been a father figure, a teacher, 
even a one night stand. In Psycho violence replaces sex. In Hostel sex and violence 
mutually exist, mere pleasures, preferable only due to a matter of taste. 
I have provided a relatively clear picture of my understanding of subjectivity and 
identity up to this point, stressing how subjectivity is a condition of self-awareness that is 
not static and given but is itself subject to the influence of various processes of 
subjectivation operating in culture with the purpose of producing the most normal, which 
is to say socially functional and productive, subjects possible. I have also described my 
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understanding of subjectivity as stemming from a psychoanalytic perspective. It is now 
time to explain that perspective more fully. 
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PSYCHOANALYSIS: THE INVERTED MIRROR STAGE EFFECT 
Jacques Lacan elevates irregularity into an inevitably central position in any act of 
thinking culture. His lesson is that an aporia does not signal the end of thought, a limit, 
but instead a location from which one must veer away from one course and into a new 
course of thinking. Those tricks of consciousness that seek to assure the thinking 
individual that to think is to be, cog ito ergo sum, here is where Lacan turned his scorn 
and it is here that he spoke his lesson. Irregularity must be thought as regular, the 
inescapable strangeness of experience mediated into meaningfulness cannot be effaced, it 
is in investigating how regularity and meaning come to be draped over what is essentially 
without either that the pitfalls of purely rational thought are most dangerous. What must 
be thought is the regular irregular. Lacan does not instruct one to attempt the act of 
thinking the paradox, or, to formulate this in even better terms, Lacan's lesson is not one 
of refusing the Siren-call of knowledge, it is one of refusing to succumb to the 
impossible urge to "think the paradox," the lure of the rational, refusing to even try and 
make a gesture of futile ratiocination. Abandoning the ship of fools called rationality to 
founder upon the rocks, Lacan veered off onto his on course, the sweet song of the Siren 
knowledge a symphonic soundtrack of apocalypse. Lacanian psychoanalysis is 
methodologically negative capability institutionalized; anti-institution par excellence, and 
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as such seems to be the discourse most appropriate to an investigation into the manner in 
which subjectivity, that most basic of rational categories, should come into question. 
For Lacan language is the alpha and omega of subjectivity. Language is how an 
animal being (the human object) becomes a human being (a subject); it is significant that 
in one of Lacan's earliest (and most important) statements on subjectivity, "The Mirror 
Stage as Formative of the I Function," he emphasizes that the pre-subjective child is an 
infant, a word which of course stems from the root infans, meaning without language. 
Language is the domain in which the human is born. The distinction between animal 
being and human being recalls Althusser's claim regarding repression. To be human is to 
be a subject; to be a subject one must enter language. 
Entering language is no empty turn of a phrase. For Lacan that is exactly what one 
does--enters language. Zizek, following Lacan, has explained "the very constitution of 
the subject" in terms of "its entry into the space of symbolization" (82). As we shall see 
more clearly, this spatial metaphor for language and symbolic experience is vital. 
Language is a domain that always precedes the subject, and far exceeds the subject's 
ability to grasp it. In other words language is a vast place in which the subject finds him 
or herself located, and which always eludes total comprehension, total mapping, and total 
understanding. A subject's experience of language is always partial, disjointed, local and 
meaningful only in terms of that particular's subject's experience much in the same way 
that one's experience of any vast geographic space is, at any particular moment, limited 
only to one's experience of their local position. This partial experience is inevitable. 
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Lacan described this domain of language as the Symbolic register of experience. 
Subjectivity is an effect of a human being's location in the Symbolic. Lacan described 
three registers of human experience: the Symbolic, the Imaginary, and the Real. Lacan's 
three registers of experience are often difficult to describe, and Lacan himself 
continuously revised his own understanding of them. In as brief a manner as possible I 
can state that the Symbolic is the register of language, the Imaginary is the register of the 
visual image, and the Real is that which resists representation in either of the other two, 
or, as Lacan himself said, that which resists symbolization. It should be stressed at this 
point that human experience takes place in all three registers simultaneously, and the 
division into these registers represents an attempt to narrow one's analytical focus to 
specific aspects of experience; i.e., one cannot speak of purely symbolic experience, one 
can only choose to focus on the Symbolic at the expense of the other two registers. 
Lacan, late in his career, came to describe the relationship of these registers as that of a 
knot: three strands of experience inextricably bound together, overlapping and 
intertwining, incapable of being loosened much less of being separated, this was the 
figure Lacan called the Borromean knot. 
Fredric Jameson explains Lacan understands of the process of subjectivation as "a 
determination of the subject by language-[which] is not to say linguistic determinism" 
(Jameson 92). Lacan, in his widely read "Seminar on The Purloined Letter" says quite 
simply, "that it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject" (Ecrits 7). 
Subjectivation is always a limitation, a fitting of a human being into the Symbolic, into 
symbolization as such, and the fit is not always altogether comfortable. There is always 
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more to the "subject" than mere subjectivity. The Symbolic always precedes the subject, 
but the "subject," as determined by the Symbolic, is not exhaustive of the human being 
out of which (of which?) it is constructed. This notion of the non-exhaustiveness of the 
Symbolic will come up again. It is on "the symbolic plane," as Lacan calls it later in 
Seminar III, that the subject exists as such, that identity is possible. On the symbolic 
plane human beings adopt the humanizing shell of subjectivity, attaching themselves in 
various ways to chains of signification at various points--Lacan called these pointes de 
capiton. The intersection of Symbolic, Imaginary and Real that human beings understand 
as conscious existence revolves around these quilting points, the place in which particular 
subjectivities are anchored in discourse. But, and it is clear from just has been said, 
subjectivity is only considered in terms of symbolic relations. What is it about the 
Symbolic register, characterized as it is by language, which is so important for the 
making of a "human" being, that is to say a subject? 
It is the basic law of language, what Lacan defines as the law of symbolization. 
Meaning is a consequence of the law of symbolization. The law of symbolization can be 
described as a dialectical relationship of absence and presence, exemplified for Lacan in 
Freud's famousJort:da example from Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The signifier, the 
word, that basic unit of language, only functions in the absence of that which it names; 
the presence of the word always indicates the lack of the object, or, to say this another 
way, it is the absence that allows for some other presence in the first place. Again, lack as 
constitutive of any human experience. Or, as Lacan states in Seminar XI "Everything 
emerges from the structure of the signifier" (206). What this means is that subjectivity, or 
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"everything" which makes one a human being, is a consequence of the law of 
symbolization, demonstrated by the structure of the signifier, the logic of absence and 
presence, the play of the signifier, the inevitable lack at the heart of every human being. 
But the Symbolic is only part of the story. 
What about relations taking place outside the Symbolic? After all, when one 
considers one's self as a subject it is unlikely that one first of all thinks of language: 
grammar, syntax, or an especially meaningful signifier or two. No, it is far more likely 
that one thinks first of all of an image of a body, a material being, an image of one's 
physical form. Registers. One tends to thinks of one's self as an embodied presence. 
Lacan described three registers of experience, all of which were involved in any 
subjective experience whatsoever; recall the figure of the Borromean knot. This was 
Lacan's model for describing the relationship of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the 
Real. The Symbolic defines subjectivity as such but the latter is not exclusively a 
symbolic affair. Human experience is inevitably a fabric stretched across all three The 
Real is that which resists symbolization, remains forever literally unspeakable, the Real 
is: 
essentially that which resists symbolization and thus resists the dialectization 
characteristic of the symbolic order, in which one thing can be substituted for 
another. Not everything is fungible; certain things are not interchangeable for the 
simple reason they cannot be "signifierized." (Fink 92) 
The Real is not the real world that is there before it is described by language; it is instead 
those aspects of that world that elude symbolization. The Real is what is there without 
symbols to mediate it into meaning. It can never be symbolized. 
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The Imaginary, it must be understood, does not occur as a stage prior to the 
Symbolic. Nor is it, strictly speaking, some larger field of experience in which the 
Symbolic takes place. The relationship of the Symbolic to the Imaginary is the 
relationship of describing a sunset to seeing a sunset. In the Imaginary symbolization 
does not take place, and this absence of symbolization results in the absence of the logic 
of presence and absence that structures (that is the first logical step towards structure as 
such) the Symbolic. The Imaginary is the register of experience characterized by the 
plenitude of the spatio-visual relation, a kind of pure visual existence. The Imaginary is 
the realm of the image. Jameson describes the Imaginary "as a particular spatial 
configuration, whose bodies primarily entertain relationships of inside/outside with one 
another," which is to say various relationships of identity, which I understand to coincide 
with his term "inside," and difference, coincidental with "outside," in the sense of being 
separate (Jameson 87). 
The logic of the imago, conditioned by a basic fact of identification, dominates 
the Imaginary. What this means is that in the Imaginary an image exists not in a 
"signifier-izable" form, but in a relationship of pure identity (that image and "I" are the 
same) and difference (that image and "I" are not the same), pure spatio-visual 
relationship. This logic is the one that implicates the Imaginary in subjectivation, via a 
developmental process Lacan labeled the mirror stage. 
In his "Mirror Stage" essay Lacan describes how the infant's early experience 
with its own image "reveals both a libidinal dynamism ... and an ontological structure of 
the human world" (76). Lacan goes on to say the mirror stage is "an identification, in the 
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full sense analysis gives to the term; namely, the transformation that takes place ... when 
he assumes an image," or, in other words, an identification with an image (of one's 
physical self) that then becomes the manner in which one understands one's physical self. 
What am I? I'm that image in the mirror, that's me, in my limited entirety, the full 
measure of my fragile being. Lacan's mirror is that place where I find myself for the first 
time. This "jubilant assumption of his specular image" manifests "the symbolic matrix in 
which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic 
of identification with the other, and before language restores to it, in the universal, its 
function as subject" (76). 
Long before the entry into the Symbolic register, the true emergence of the 
subject as Lacan conceptualizes it, a foundation is being laid, a foundation upon which 
the subject will be raised. The mirror is the figure for the beginning of what can properly 
be called the human being. Lacan is quite specific about this: 
This form [the form with which the nascent subject identifies] would, moreover, 
have to be called the "ideal-I" [Lacan's rendering of Freud's Ideal Ich] ... in the 
sense that it will also be the rootstock of secondary identifications, this latter term 
subsuming the libidinal normalization functions. But the important point is that 
this form situates the agency known as the ego, prior to its social determination, in 
a fictional direction that will forever remain irreducible for any single individual 
or, rather, that will only asymptotically approach the subject's becoming, no 
matter how successful the dialectical by which he must resolve, as I, his 
discordance with his own reality. (76) 
Before this imaginary organization of the mental functioning into a single, coherent entity 
the animal being (human object) cannot be considered a human being (a subject). The 
mind, as it were, becomes attached to a body via the mirror stage, an act that is absolutely 
fundamental for the development of a consciousness capable of adopting subjectivity. 
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Lacan's mirror is the means by which subjectivity, that "function of the subject," 
becomes possible (Ecrits 429). 
So what then takes place in audience experiences of graphic violence in horror 
films? What is going on for an audience watching Josh's senseless mutilation, psychically 
speaking? What are they experiencing that has implications for their own subjectivity? 
The destruction of an image comparable with that which the subject has identified in its 
first step towards becoming a subject. This is what I have called the inverted mirror stage 
effect. 
The visual identification essential to the mirror stage, therefore essential to the 
development of subjectivity, is inverted in the audience's experience of graphic violence. 
Instead of identifying in the Imaginary with a stable body, one that provides a static point 
of reference from which to extrapolate an understanding of one's own body, the grisly 
images of violence provide bodies shown as unstable, indeed volatile, and ultimately very 
fragile. Furthermore, the audience is put in an awkward position of identifying with these 
bodies as they are being destroyed. 
It is apparent in Lacan's Borromean knot model that the Imaginary is as much a 
component of human experience as the Symbolic. Lacan, in other words, does not limit 
human experience in the Imaginary register to only a particular time, early childhood for 
instance. It is clear that the Symbolic is the experiential register in which most human 
experience occurs, but it seems equally clear that this is due not to some intrinsic 
advantage of the Symbolic but instead to the brute fact of language as the medium 
through which so much human experience is necessarily mediated. Why should the 
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Imaginary identification crucial to subjectivity be limited only to a specific time during 
early development? Perhaps, instead, it is more the case that the imaginary identification 
becomes subjected to the law of symbolization that establishes the subject; that 
subjectivity, as a matter of course, subordinates the experiences taking place outside its 
domain. This would begin to provide an answer to the question of rationality's 
stranglehold on post-Enlightenment experience-the Symbolic rules experience with an 
iron hand, imposing the logic underlying its own existence upon any experience: absence 
and presence, lack and plenitude, death and life. 
A means then of understanding this focus on torture, on the process of physically 
taking apart a body, is to see it as necessary; an end in and of itself. Whereas Marian's 
death in Psycho served various narrative purposes, Josh's torture, even when divorced 
from any context, any narrative, still has spectacular effect, that is to say the effect of 
subversive spectacle. Divorce Marian's death from narrative and one still has a harrowing 
cinematic sequence, one in which audiences would still understand that a violent murder 
is taking place. But in order to understand this the audience must consciously mediate the 
visual spectacle of the scene with their own symbolically determined concept of murder; 
in other words, they have to symbolically fill in the gaps in the visual spectacle. The 
shower scene does not show violence, it merely presents several images in quick 
succession that when symbolically mediated become a narrative of violence. When 
viewed in slow motion18, the scene loses its renowned power to shock: instead of a 
visceral experience the audience has to actively participate in making the narrative work, 
18 As Laura Mulvey describes in her account of Douglas Gordon's exhibit 24 Hour Psycho, during which 
the film was slowed down to 1I24th its running speed; Gordon was drawing attention to the relationship of 
the still image, the photograph, and the cinematic apparatus, the medium of film. 
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to tie together the images, to make them make sense. The images must be submitted to 
symbolization. Josh's torture, on the other hand, requires no such symbolic mediation. In 
fact, the latter frustrates symbolic mediation by occurring so randomly, so haphazardly, 
without any sense. Josh's torture resists symbolization not as some Real existential 
component but due to its intrinsic Imaginary value: there is "meaning" in the image, one 
lost in describing what that meaning is. The image of Josh's torture is enough, in fact, 
recalling Scarry's emphasis on the visual aspect of the torture process, it is safe to say 
that the torture takes place entirely in an Imaginary l9. 
Fredric Jameson, in his lucid and nuanced analysis of these two Lacanian 
concepts (see "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan"), speaks of the impossible yet entirely 
necessary task of formulating the terms of an Imaginary analysis, a new hermeneutic 
deriving from an attention to the peculiarities of the Imaginary register. For Jameson, one 
means of escaping the jaws of purely rationalist thought-in his work more or less 
identified with the logic of capitalism-is to seek refuge outside the Symbolic, to try and 
draw insight from an experience of the Imaginary that, while it's true would nevertheless 
have to find itself expressed in language, still might result in some thought capable of 
countering the pure rationalism of the Symbolic. I understand this call for Imaginary 
analysis as a call to pay special attention to the manner in which purely visual 
experiences may operate in a manner counter to how they fit into the Symbolic. 
19 "Entirely" is misleading; Josh's torture takes place in all three registers, like any other human 
experience, however, it is meaningful via the Imaginary and resists the normalizing, rational 
meaningfulness of the Symbolic. 
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